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HATE EXPOSED TO THE LIGHT OF DAY:
DETERMINING TIRE BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA'S
EXPRESSIVE PURPOSE SOLELY FROM OBJECTIVE
EVIDENCE
Cara J. Frey
Abstract: In the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court took considerable steps toward decreasing
the uncertainty surrounding an organization's associational freedoms by requiring an
organization seeking to exclude individuals solely based on status to prove that its expressive
purpose would be undermined if it included such members. However, these Supreme Court
cases failed to establish any consistent approach to determining an organization's expressive
purpose. Problems have arisen most acutely with the claims of gays seeking to be included in
the Boy Scouts of America (BSA), an organization with a multifaceted and vague message.
As the law now stands, courts have broad discretion to decide what facts are relevant in
determining the BSA's expressive purpose. Unfortunately, this broad discretion has led to
some courts' accepting the homophobic views of individual BSA members and leaders as the
expressive purpose of the entire organization. This Comment proposes that the BSA's
expressive purpose be determined only from objective evidence. If the BSA seeks
constitutional protection to hate, its expressive purpose must be clearly defined in position
statements, written in recruiting brochures, announced to sponsors, and referred to in either
the original or amended bylaws.
On July 8, 1990, the Newark Star-Ledger published an article titled,
"Seminar Addresses Needs of Homosexual Teens."' The article pictured
James Dale and identified him as the co-president of the Rutgers
University Lesbian/Gay Alliance.2 Within a month, Dale received a letter
from James W. Kay, council executive of the Monmouth Council of the
Boy Scouts of America (BSA), informing Dale that the BSA had revoked
his registration as an adult leader.3 In response to Dale's inquiry as to the
grounds for his dismissal, Kay wrote: "[The] grounds for [this]
membership revocation [are] the standards for leadership established by
the [BSA], which specifically forbid membership to homosexuals."4
Ten years earlier, the Oakland Tribune had published an article on gay
teenagers, based upon interviews with teenagers who openly identified
themselves as gay.' Timothy Curran, another former Boy Scout, was one
1. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1204-05, (N.J. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct.
865 (Jan. 14,2000).
2. See id at 1205.
3. See id.
4. Id
5. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 220 (Cal. 1998).
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of the teenagers interviewed for the article.6 After the Tribune published
the article, Quentin Alexander, the executive director of the Mt. Diablo
Council of the BSA, investigated whether Curran was still active in the
program.7 When Alexander discovered that Curran was not still active,
the BSA "took no firther action."8 However, shortly after release of the
article, Curran applied to the Mt. Diablo Council to attend the 1981 BSA
National Jamboree.9 Alexander told him that the BSA would not accept
his application.' When Curran asked if it was because he was gay,
Alexander responded, "Yes, it is."
I
"
Both Dale and Curran filed lawsuits against the BSA.12 Ultimately, the
New Jersey and California supreme courts considered whether the BSA
could exclude a leader because he was openly gay. 3 The Dale and
Curran cases have not only revived the vigorous debate as to what
constitutes a public accommodation, but have also inspired controversy
over how courts define an organization's expressive purpose. As the law
now stands, courts have broad discretion to decide what facts are relevant
in determining an organization's expressive purpose. 4 This broad
discretion allows courts to determine the BSA's expressive purpose from
individual members' personal views rather than from the BSA's views as
objectively stated in its literature. Courts, by relying on these individual
members' personal views, may therefore grant First Amendment
protection of expressive association to the closeted views of the BSA. As
a result, state antidiscrimination efforts are unduly frustrated.
While the First Amendment has been interpreted to protect the
expression of hate,' s by no means has it been read, or should it be read, to
favor it.16 On the contrary, the structure of the Constitution as a whole
leaves the eradication of hate within the sphere of legitimate state
6. See id.
7. See id. at 221.
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
13. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
14. See infra Part U.B.1-4.
15. See Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 25 (Ill. 1978)
("[U]se of the swastika is a symbolic form of free speech entitled to first amendment protections.").
16. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) ("For it is a central tenet of the
First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.").
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interests.'7 Public-accommodations laws are states' response to hate in
certain odious forms." This Comment proposes that the BSA's
expressive purpose be determined only from objective evidence. While
the proposal allows the BSA to express its hatred, it also democratizes
the process by which the BSA must articulate its message of hate if it
seeks to shelter itself from public-accommodations laws by taking refuge
in the First Amendment. 9 If the BSA's "message" is hate, the objective
analysis proposed here requires that the hate be exposed to the light of
day-that it be made visible to members and potential members who
then may decide whether to embrace such message. Only when the BSA
democratically embraces hatred as its message should federal lawimmunize the BSA from state public-accommodations laws.2"
Part I of this Comment explores the tension between state public-
accommodations laws and an organization's associational rights. In so
doing, it discusses the Roberts trilogy,2' a line of U.S. Supreme Court
cases that established a framework for balancing an individual's statutory
right to be free from discrimination in places of public accommodation
with an organization's constitutional right to associate freely with like-
minded members. Additionally, Part I distinguishes the right of
expressive association recognized by the Roberts trilogy from the right of
free speech protected by Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group.' Part R provides the objective evidence relevant to
determining the BSA's expressive purpose and examines how courts in
four recent BSA cases have determined whether an anti-gay message is
an expressive purpose of the BSA. Finally, Part III discusses the reasons
courts should limit their analysis of the BSA's expressive purpose to
objective evidence and suggests that if the BSA seeks to shelter itself
from public-accommodations laws, its expressive purpose must be
17. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81-88 (1980).
18. See Fuchilla v. Layman, 537 A.2d 652, 660 (N.J. 1988) ("[IThe overarching goal of the [New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination] is nothing less than the eradication 'of the cancer of
discrimination.'"); see also Pamela Griffin, Note, Exclusion and Access in Public Accommodations:
First Amendment Limitations upon State Law, 16 Pac. LJ. 1047, 1056 (1985).
19. See infra Part II.
20. Under federal public-accommodations laws, sexual orientation is not a protected classifica-
tion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1994). As a result, under federal law the BSA is free to discriminate
against gay scout leaders.
21. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v.
Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1
(1988).
22. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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defined in position statements, written in recruiting brochures,
announced to sponsors, and referred to in either the original bylaws or
amended bylaws.
I. TENSION BETWEEN LAWS BARRING DISCRIMINATION IN
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND AN ORGANIZATION'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
Public-accommodations statutes prohibit discrimination by private
organizations that control access to public facilities.' The goal of these
statutes is to ensure that all members of society have equal access to
goods and services.24 However, in creating this equal right of access, the
statutes may conflict with an organization's First Amendment right to
associate with whomever it chooses.25 As a result of this conflict, the
U.S. Supreme Court has examined the impact of public-accommodations
laws on the exercise of an organization's constitutional liberties in a
number of cases.26
A. Public-Accommodations Laws Bar Private Organizations from
Discriminating Against Individuals on the Basis of a Protected
Characteristic
States initially enacted public-accommodations legislation to fill the
void created when the U.S. Supreme Court in 1882 struck down the first
federal public-accommodations law in the Civil Rights Cases.27 More
than eighty years passed before Congress enacted a new law barring
discrimination in public accommodations, Title II of the 1964 Civil
23. See Sally Frank, The Key to Unlocking the Clubhouse Door: The Application of
Antidiscrimination Laws to Quasi-Private Clubs, 2 Mich. J. Gender & L. 27, 41 (1994).
24. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).
25. For a discussion of the inherent conflict between public-accommodations laws and the First
Amendment, see generally Griffin, supra note 18.
26. See Roberts, 468 U.S. 609; Rotary, 481 U.S. 537; New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. 1;
Hurley, 515 U.S. 557.
27. 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see also Frank, supra note 23, at 41; Note, Discrimination in Access to
Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public-Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. Rev. L. &
Soe. Change 215, 239 (1978) [hereinafter Survey]; Paul Varela, Note, A Scout Is Friendly: Freedom
ofAssociation and the State Effort to End Private Discrimination, 30 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 919, 932
(1989).
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Rights Act.2" While Title II provides some protection to certain groups of
people, state laws historically provide the most effective means of
preventing discrimination.29
Public-accommodations statutes do not prohibit all forms of discrim-
ination, only discrimination based on enumerated classifications. While
they vary from state to state, most public-accommodations statutes
prohibit discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin,3° and some state and municipal statutes also prohibit discrim-
ination on the basis of other classifications, including affectional or
sexual orientation.3 It is important to note that in the vast majority of
states, where sexual orientation is not a protected classification, gays and
lesbians have no statutory cause of action against an organization that
has excluded them solely based on their sexual orientation.
The scope of state public-accommodations statutes varies depending
upon legislative definitions and judicial interpretations of what
constitutes a public accommodation.32 In some states, satisfying the
public-accommodations definition depends on whether the organization
exists at a particular physical place. 3 Other states define public
28. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to
2000a-6 (1994)). The statute states: "All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of
race, color, religion, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a).
29. See Survey, supra note 27, at 238-40.
30. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.030(1) (1998) (listing race; creed; color;, national origin;
sex; presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability; or use of trained dog guide or service
animal); 775 Il. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/1-102 (West 1993) (listing race; color, religion; sex; national
origin; ancestry; age; marital status; physical or mental handicap; or unfavorable discharge from
military service).
31. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 272, § 98 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (prohibiting
discrimination on account of sexual orientation); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-4 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999)
(prohibiting discrimination on account of affectional or sexual orientation). For a survey of state and
municipal laws against sexual-orientation discrimination, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylaw:
Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet 356-61 (1999).
32. See Frank, supra note 23, at 41; Marissa L. Goodman, Note, A Scout Is Morally Straight,
Brave, Clean, Trustworthy... and Heterosexual? Gays in the Boy Scouts ofAmerica, 27 Hofstra L.
Rev. 825, 830 (1999); Varela, supra note 27, at 934.
33. See, e.g., NJ. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-4 (providing that "[a]ll persons shall have the oppor-
tunity... to obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of
public accommodation"); see also Frank, supra note 23, at 41.
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accommodations in terms of public use,34 while some states define it in
terms of the business aspects of an organization.35 Importantly, if a court
determines that an organization is not a public accommodation, but
rather a private organization, the organization may carry out its
membership practices as it sees fit.
B. Freedom of Expressive Association Guarantees an Organization
the Right to Choose Its Members
A state's goal of promoting equality may directly conflict with an
organization's desire to associate with those it favors and not to associate
with those it disfavors. The conflict between associational freedom and
equal access "involves the two virtual first principles of contemporary
constitutional law: freedom and equality. The right to choose one's
associates (freedom) is pitted against the right to equal treatment
(equality)."'36 Choosing one could result in the unfair denial of goods and
services to an excluded group.37 Choosing the other could extinguish the
First Amendment rights of the excluding groups."
While the word "associate" does not appear in the text of the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court has recognized that freedom of
expressive association is rooted in the First Amendment's right to
petition the government for redress of grievances, right to free speech,
and right to freedom of assembly.39 In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson,' the Court for the first time discussed an individual's right to
freedom of association, concluding that "[i]t is beyond debate that
freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process
34. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.675 (1997) (barring discrimination in "any place or service
offering to the public accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges whether in the nature of
goods, services, lodgings, amusements or otherwise"); see also Frank, supra note 23, at 41.
35. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 2000) (providing that "[a]ll persons within
the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion,
ancestry, national origin, or disability are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever"); see also
Frank, supra note 23, at 41.
36. William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 68, 69
(1986).
37. See Varela, supra note 27, at 926.
38. See id.
39. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
40. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'" Courts have relied on Patterson
to protect expressive groups formed to promote minority viewpoints as
well as nonminority organizations advocating the right to be free from
intrusion by minority groups.42
C. Balancing State Public-Accommodations Laws with an
Organization's Constitutional Right to Expressive Association
In considering this fundamental conflict between associational
freedom and equality, the U.S. Supreme Court has developed a
framework to determine when a state's interest in promoting equal
opportunity outweighs an organization's First Amendment associational
rights4 This framework rests on the principle that an individual's
statutory right to be free from discrimination in public accommodations
takes precedence over an organization's constitutional right to expressive
association unless that organization can establish a genuine connection
between its exclusionary policy and its expressive activities.' Therefore,
an organization may discriminate in its membership only when the
organization's expressive purpose would be substantially burdened by
forced inclusion of members of the unwelcome classification.45 This right
should be distinguished from an organization's constitutional right to
exclude from its membership persons who advocate a message that the
organization wishes not to disseminate.'
1. Roberts v. United States Jaycees: No Constitutional Protection Is
Warranted When Associational Purposes Are Only Tenuously
Connected to Exclusivity
The Supreme Court first addressed the requisite link between ap
organization's expressive purpose and its exclusionary membership
41. I at460.
42. See Shawn M. Larsen, Note, For Blacks Only: The Associational Freedoms of Private
Minority Clubs, 49 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 359, 369 (1999) (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958)).
43. See Roberts, 468 U.S. 609; Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537
(1987); New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
44. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628.
45. See id at 627-28.
46. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 574-75 (1995).
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policy in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.4 7 The United States Jaycees
(Jaycees), founded in 1920, is a nonprofit membership organization. 48
The Jaycees' objective, as explained in its bylaws, is to pursue "such
educational and charitable purposes as will promote and foster the
growth and development of young men's civic organizations in the
United States."'49 In 1974, the Minneapolis chapter of the Jaycees began
admitting women as "regular members," an act prohibited by the national
organization's bylaws." After the president of the national organization
warned the local chapter that its charter might be revoked if it continued
to admit women, the local chapter filed charges of discrimination under
the Minnesota Human Rights Act." The national organization contended
that by forcing it to admit women as full voting members, the Act
violated the male members' constitutional rights of free speech and
association. 2 Agreeing with the national organization, the Eighth Circuit
determined that the First Amendment's freedom of association protected
the Jaycees' right to choose its members because "the advocacy of
political and public causes, selected by the membership, [was] not [an]
insubstantial part of [its activities]."53 The court concluded that applying
the Minnesota statute to the Jaycees would directly interfere with that
freedom because allowing women into the organization would result in
"some change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast."''
The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing the Eighth Circuit decision,
concluded that the Jaycees failed to demonstrate that admitting women as
full voting members would burden the Jaycees' ability to engage in
protected activities or disseminate particular views.55 Disallowing
"unsupported generalizations" about the attitudes of men and women, the
Court held that the Jaycees' gender exclusivity was only tenuously
connected to its associational purposes and therefore did not warrant
constitutional protection. 6 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
47. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
48. Seeid. at612.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 614.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 615.
53. Id. at 616-17 (internal quotation omitted).
54. Id. at 617 (internal quotation omitted).
55. See id. at 627.
56. Id. at 628.
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established a framework to determine when an organization's
constitutional right of expressive association outweighs a state's goal of
equal opportunity. For the Jaycees' right of expressive association to be
constitutionally protected, the Jaycees had to make a "substantial"
showing that admitting unwelcome members would "change the content
or impact of the organization's speech.""7 Although the Court established
the requirement that an organization's expressive purpose must be
impaired by inclusion of disfavored individuals, it did not provide
guidance as to how to determine an organization's expressive purpose.
2. Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club: There Is
No Constitutional Protection to Exclude When Application of
Public-Accommodations Statute Does Not Alter an Organization's
Basic Goals
In Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club,58 the
Supreme Court again faced the question whether an organization could
exclude women based on the claim that exclusion of women was part of
the group's expressive purpose.5 9 Rotary International is a nonprofit
corporation founded in 1905.' Prior to this case, the Rotary Manual
stated that it was "an organization of business and professional men
united worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage high
ethical standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in
the world."'" Membership in Rotary Clubs was open only to men and, as
the General Secretary of Rotary International testified, this exclusion of
women was "an aspect of fellowship... that [was] enjoyed by
the.., male membership."'62
In 1977, after the Rotary Club of Duarte began admitting women to
active membership, Rotary International revoked its charter and
terminated its membership. 3 The Duarte Club and two of its women
members filed a complaint alleging that Rotary International's actions
violated California's public-accommodations law, the Unruh Civil Rights
57. Id.
58. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
59. See id at 539.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Id at541.
63. See id
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Act.64 Rotary International contended that the Unruh Act's requiring
California Rotary Clubs to admit women members conflicted with the
Rotary Club's right of expressive association.' Affirming the California
Court of Appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that admitting
women to Rotary Clubs would not "affect in any significant way" the
existing members' ability to achieve their various purposes.' Application
of the public-accommodations statute did not require the Rotary Clubs to
"alter any of [their] activities" or "abandon their basic goals" as stated in
their manual. 67 As in Roberts, the Court concluded that the Rotary Clubs
should not be afforded constitutional protection of expressive association
in their effort to exclude women.68
3. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York: Organizations
Must Show a Necessary Connection Between Expressive Purpose
and Exclusionary Policy
One year after Rotary, the Supreme Court in New York State Club
Ass 'n v. City of New York 69 again used the Roberts framework to hold
that certain organizations should not be afforded constitutional protection
to exclude individuals based on membership in a protected class.7" A
consortium of private clubs sought judgment declaring unconstitutional a
New York City human rights law prohibiting discrimination.7' Because
the law did not require the organizations "to abandon or alter" any
protected First Amendment activities, the Court held that the law did not
infringe upon members' rights of expressive association. 72 The law did
not prohibit organizations from excluding individuals who espoused
contrary views, but simply prohibited an organization from using sex,
race, and other protected classifications as "shorthand measures" for
determining membership.' The Court recognized that if an organization
could prove that it was organized for specific expressive purposes and
64. See id.; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 2000).
65. See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 543.
66. Id. at 547-48.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 549.
69. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
70. See id. at 13.
71. See id. at 7.
72. Id. at 13 (quoting Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987)).
73. Id.
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that it would not be able to promote its views "nearly as effectively" if it
could not limit its membership to those who share the same status-based
characteristics, the organization was free to exclude.74 The Court noted,
however, that most of the organizations covered by the law would not be
able to show this connection between their expressive purpose and
exclusionary policy.'
D. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group:
Distinguishing Free Speech from Expressive Association
In 1995, the Supreme Court was once again faced with balancing an
organization's First Amendment rights against an individual's right to be
free from discrimination in public accommodations. In Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group,6 a group of gay, lesbian, and
bisexual descendants of Irish immigrants (GLIB) filed suit alleging
violations of Massachusetts' public-accommodations law after being
denied a permit to march in the St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day
Parade.7 The trial court, following the Roberts trilogy, held that
inclusion of GLIB did not infringe on the parade's expressive association
rights." Because the parade included numerous groups espousing
conflicting messages, the trial court determined that the parade had no
expressive purpose.79 On appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, the parade organizers framed their defense in terms of free speech,
rather than expressive association.80 However, the court also rejected this
defense.8'
Reversing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court found that the public-accommodations statute
violated the parade organizers' freedom of speech. 2 The Court
concluded that an organization's right of free speech includes the right to
control the content of its speech, and it may therefore exclude from its
74. Id.
75. See i&
76. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
77. See id. at561.
78. See id at 563.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 564.
81. See id at 563-64.
82. See id at 573.
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membership persons who advocate a position contrary to the
organization's message.8 3 Central to this holding was the Court's
acceptance of the parade organizers' assertion that by excluding GLIB, it
did not intend to exclude gays and lesbians from the parade, but instead
declined to include GLIB's message.'
Although the Roberts trilogy played a prominent role in the state-court
rulings, these cases had almost no significance in the Supreme Court
proceeding." The Roberts trilogy was absent from the Court's decision
because the Court decided the case on free-speech rather than expressive-
association grounds.8 6 Nevertheless, in the last passages of Hurley, the
Court concluded that the outcome of the case would not differ under the
Roberts trilogy.87 As a result of this dictum, one scholar has suggested
that Hurley has the potential to weaken the Roberts framework. 8 Unlike
Hurley, the Roberts trilogy carefully examined the expressive purposes
of an organization to determine whether the forced inclusion of a'
protected class of individuals would substantially burden any clearly
defined expressive goals of the organization.89 This part of the Roberts
framework led the Massachusetts state courts to conclude that because
almost every group that wanted to march in the parade was allowed to do
so, the parade had no clearly defined expressive purpose.' ° However, the
Court took a different approach, stating that "a narrow, succinctly
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection."91
Under this "lenient approach,"92 the parade organizers had no burden of
proving the parade's expressive purpose or, more generally, that the
parade had a specific message.93
The Hurley Court's protection of free speech is distinct from the
Court's jurisprudence regarding expressive purpose.' 4 Hurley protects an
83. See id. at 574-75.
84. See id. at 572.
85. See Darren Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness: Hurley, Free Speech, and Gay and Lesbian
Equality, I U. Pa. J. Const. L. 85, 98 (1998) (discussing "application" of Roberts trilogy in Hurley).
86. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573-80.
87. Seeid. at 580-81.
88. See Hutchinson, supra note 85, at 102.
89. See id.
90. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 562-64.
91. Id. at 569.
92. Hutchinson, supra note 85, at 102.
93. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-70.
94. See infra Part H.B.1, 4.
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organization's constitutional right to exclude from its membership
persons who advocate a message that an organization wishes not to
disseminate.95 The Roberts trilogy, on the other hand, protects an
organization's right to exclude from its membership persons of a
particular protected classification where mere admission of these
persons would impede the organization's expressive purpose.96 To
receive constitutional protection, membership organizations must still
prove that the application of a public-accommodations statute would
conflict with or significantly impair their members' specific expressive
purposes and activities.
II. DETERMINING THE EXPRESSIVE PURPOSE OF THE BOY
SCOUTS OF AMERICA
The Roberts trilogy's lack of guidance on how courts should
determine an organization's expressive purpose is highlighted in cases
involving the BSA, an organization with a multifaceted and vague
message. The BSA's stated purpose is to instill ethics in young boys and
provide skills training and social activities. Indeed, the organization's
Charter,97 Bylaws, 98 and Mission Statemente all promote this goal.
Nevertheless, the BSA has also expressed its desire to be treated as an
expressive association for promoting the message that homosexuality is
immoral."c° Determining whether the BSA's discriminatory policy
warrants First Amendment associational protection depends on whether
the court finds that an anti-gay message, like patriotism, reverence, and
knot tying, is an expressive purpose of the BSA. This determination,
95. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574.
96. See supra Part LC.1-3.
97. The BSA Charter states that the purpose of the BSA is "to promote, through organization, and
cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys to do things for themselves and others, to train
them in Scoutcraft, and to teach them patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues."
Goodman, supra note 32, at 850 n.202 (quoting Boy Scouts of Am., Charter and Bylaws 3 (1993)).
98. The BSA Bylaws describe the manner in which this purpose shall be achieved, stating that
"emphasis shall be placed upon its educational program and the oaths, promises, and codes of the
Scouting program for character development, citizenship training, and mental and physical fitness."
IL at 850 n.203 (quoting Boy Scouts of Am., Charter and Bylaws 6 (1993)).
99. The BSA Mission Statement provides: "The mission of the Boy Scouts of America is to
prepare young people to make ethical choices over their lifetimes by instilling in them the values of
the Scout Oath and Law." Boy Scouts of America Adult Application, No. 28-5010.
100. See, eg., Brief for Defendant-Respondents at 29-32, Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d
270 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (No. A-2427-95T3) (on file with author).
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however, has proven controversial and lays the foundation for arguments
currently before the U.S. Supreme Court.
A. Evidence Relevant to Determining the BSA 's Expressive Purpose
In four recent cases, the BSA has argued, through testimony by
leaders and members, that forced inclusion of gay troop leaders would
undermine its anti-gay message.'' The BSA argues that the words
"morally straight" and "clean" in the Scout Oath 0 2 and Law'0 3 stand for
the proposition that homosexuality is immoral."° According to the Boy
Scout Handbook, to be a "morally straight" Scout
[You must] be a person of strong character [and] your relationships
with others should be honest and open. You should respect and
defend the rights of all people. Be clean in your speech and actions,
and remain faithful in your religious beliefs. The values you
practice as a Scout will help you shape a life of virtue and self-
reliance. 105
To be a "clean" Scout one should "keep[] his body and mind
fit[,] ... choose[] the company of those who live by high stan-
dards[, and] ... help[] keep his home and community clean.' 1 6 The
Handbook further explains the meaning of "clean":
You can't avoid getting dirty when you work and play hard. But
when the game is over or the job is done, that kind of dirt washes
off with soap and water.
101. See, e.g., Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580,
585 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
102. The Scout Oath states:
On my honor I will do my best
To do my duty to God and my country
and to obey the Scout Law;
To help other people at all times;
To keep myself physically strong,
mentally awake, and morally straight.
Boy Scouts of Am., The Boy Scout Handbook 9 (11 th ed. 1998).
103. The Scout Law provides: "A Scout is trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind,
obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean, and reverent." Id.
104. See, e.g., Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1224 (N.J. 1999), cert. granted, 120
S. Ct. 865 (Jan. 14, 2000).
105. Boy Scouts of Am., supra note 102, at 46.
106. Id. at 53.
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There's another kind of dirt, though, that can't be scrubbed away. It
is the kind that shows up in foul language and harmful thoughts and
actions.
Swearwords and dirty stories are often used as weapons to ridicule
other people and hurt their feelings. The same is true of racial slurs
and jokes that make fun of ethnic groups or people with physical or
mental limitations. A Scout knows there is no kindness or honor in
such tasteless behavior. He avoids it in his own words and deeds.
10 7
In addition to relying on the words "morally straight" and "clean" to
support its position that an anti-gay message is an expressive purpose of
the organization, the BSA also relies on a 1978 internal memorandum, a
1983 written statement, and 1991 and 1993 position statements.' The
1978 memo is a policy statement in question-and-answer form that was
never openly distributed within the BSA hierarchy or to members or
Scout leaders."° The memo asks whether an openly gay individual can
be a Scout leader or registered unit member."0 The BSA responds in the
negative, stating that membership is a privilege and that homosexuality
and leadership/membership in Scouting are inconsistent."' In a written
statement five years later, the BSA's Legal Counsel reiterated the 1978
internal memo by stating that "[a]vowed or known homosexuals are not
permitted to register in the [BSA]. Membership in the organization is a
privilege, not a right, and the [BSA] has determined that homosexuality
and Scouting are not compatible.""'
The first position statement was published in 1991, restating why the
BSA would not accept gays as members or leaders."' Focusing on
"homosexual conduct" rather than on the exclusion of gays, the
statement read: "We believe that homosexual conduct is inconsistent
with the requirement in the Scout Oath that a Scout be morally straight
and in the Scout Law that a Scout be clean in word and deed, and that
107. Id
108. See, eg., Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 225 n.5
(Cal. 1998); Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 289-90 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998),
aff'd, 734 A.2d 1196, 1224 (NJ. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 865 (Jan. 14,2000).
109. See Richardson v. Chicago Area Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., No. 92-E-80, 1996 WL
734724, at *10 (Chicago Comm'n on Human Relations Feb. 21, 1996).
110. See a
I11. Seek
112. Curran, 952 P.2d at 225 n.5.
113. See Dale, 706 A.2d at 290.
Washington Law Review
homosexuals do not provide a desirable role model for Scouts.""' 4 In
1993, the BSA redrafted the 1991 position statement stating again that
the BSA will "not allow for the registration of avowed homosexuals as
members or as leaders."" 15
B. The Boy Scouts Cases: Examining How Each Court Determined
Whether an Anti-Gay Message Is an Expressive Purpose of the BSA
The Supreme Court of New Jersey," 6 the Supreme Court of
California,' an appellate court in California," 8 and the Chicago
Commission on Human Relations" 9 all have considered whether the
BSA, as a public accommodation, must admit gay leaders. Two of the
cases concluded that an anti-gay message is not an expressive purpose of
the BSA, and therefore forced inclusion of gays would not violate the
BSA's associational rights."' On the other hand, the concurring opinions
in the other two cases concluded that an anti-gay message is an
expressive purpose of the BSA, and as a result forced inclusion of gays
would violate the BSA's associational rights.'' While the concurring
opinions do not carry significant precedential weight, their analyses,
coupled with the analyses of the cases finding no anti-gay expressive
purpose, illustrate the debate over whether courts should allow the BSA
to shelter itself from public-accommodations laws by providing the BSA
with First Amendment associational protection. For this reason, it is
valuable to examine all four cases, including the relevant concurring
opinions.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 276-77.
116. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 865
(Jan. 14,2000).
117. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 252 (Kennard, J., concurring).
118. See Merino v. San Diego County Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., Nos. D021969,
D022829, 1997 WL 1145151, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. May 21, 1997) (Huffman, J., concurring).
119. See Richardson v. Chicago Area Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., No. 92-E-80, 1996 WL
734724, at *I (Chicago Comm'n on Human Relations Feb. 21, 1996).
120. See infra Part I.B.1, 4.
121. See infra Part ll.B.2-3.
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1. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America: Anti-Gay Message Is Not an
Expressive Purpose of the BSA and Therefore Does Not Warrant
Constitutional Protection
In Dale v. Boy Scouts ofAmerica," the Supreme Court of New Jersey
held that because an anti-gay message was not the BSA's expressive
purpose, the BSA could not exclude an openly gay scout leader solely
based on his sexual orientation." After an exemplary career as a Boy
Scout, James Dale became an assistant scoutmaster of Troop 73124 On
July 8, 1990, the Newark Star-Ledger published an article in which Dale
stated that he was gay but did not identify himself as a BSA leader or
member, or express an opinion about any BSA policies."2 Shortly after
the Star-Ledger printed the article, the BSA revoked Dale's leadership
privileges because "[the BSA] does not admit avowed homosexuals to
membership in the organization."' 26
In Dale's lawsuit against the BSA, the trial court held that the BSA
could not be forced to accept Dale without violating the BSA's
constitutional right of expressive association.' Equating the words
"clean" and "morally straight' with anti-homosexuality, the court found
that the BSA had always had a policy of excluding "active homosexuals"
and concluded that according to the BSA's mission and purpose, an
assistant scoutmaster who is an active sodomist is incompatible with
Scouting and could never be "morally straight."'2 The judge concluded
that the presence of a publicly avowed active homosexual is "absolutely
antithetical to the purpose of Scouting."'29
The appellate division, relying on the Roberts framework, reversed the
trial court decision and concluded that enforcement of New Jersey's Law
Against Discrimination would not "affect in 'any significant way' BSA's
122. 734 A.2d 1196 (NJ. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 865 (Jan. 14,2000).
123. See id at 1223.
124. See id at 1204.
125. See id at 1225.
126. Id at 1205.
127. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. MON-C-330-92, slip op. at 71 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
Nov. 3, 1995), revd, 706 A.2d 270 (N.L Super. Ct App. Div. 1998), aff'd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.L
1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 865 (Jan. 14,2000).
128. Id at 38,42.
129. Id at71.
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ability to express [its] views and to carry out [its] activities."'30 Focusing
on the fact that the BSA's Congressional Charter, Bylaws, rules and
regulations, and handbooks all are devoid of an anti-gay message, the
court refused to accept the alleged fundamental expressive nature of the
BSA's anti-gay policy.'3' The court emphasized that this policy was
never integrated into BSA documents, never written in application or
recruiting materials, never distributed throughout the BSA hierarchy,
never distributed to members, volunteers, or recruits, and never presented
to the public as representative of BSA's official position.3 ' Furthermore,
the court opined that the BSA's inclusive membership policy, as well as
its Congressional Charter stating that the BSA's Bylaws and rules will
not be "inconsistent with the law of the United States of America, or any
State thereof," align with the purposes of New Jersey's Law Against
Discrimination.'33 Finally, the court reasoned that the BSA's failure to
expel sponsors and heterosexual scouts who criticize the BSA's
discriminatory policy contradicts its policy of excluding a gay leader
"who says absolutely nothing about the morality or lifestyle of
homosexuals," but who has simply been honest about his sexual
orientation. '34
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, affirming the appellate division's
decision, concluded that because anti-gay teaching was not the BSA's
expressive purpose or "shared goal," the BSA could not exclude Dale
solely based on his sexual orientation.'35 The court refused to equate
"morally straight" and "clean" with the condemnation of homo-
sexuality. 13 6 Furthermore, the court declined to view the 1978 position
paper as representative of the members' shared views, observing that the
paper, written seventy-six years after Congress granted the BSA its
Charter, was never disseminated to members or leaders. 3 7 Additionally,
the court gave no credence to the self-serving position papers written
130. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 288 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), afftd, 734
A.2d 1196, 1224 (N.J. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 865 (Jan. 14, 2000).
131. Seeid at 290.
132. See id
133. Id. at288.
134. Id. at291.
135. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1224 (N.J. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S Ct. 865
(Jan. 14, 2000).
136. See id.
137. See id. at 1224 n.12.
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after Dale's expulsion in preparation for litigation.' Also, like the
appellate division, the supreme court perceived the BSA sponsors'
diverse views about homosexuality as further evidence that an anti-gay
message was not a unifying associational goal of the organization.'39
Finally, the court held that the BSA's.litigation stance on homosexuality
was antithetical to the organization's all-inclusive policy and revealed
that the BSA's expulsion of Dale was solely based on prejudice."
The court distinguished Hurley, concluding that Dale's status as a
leader was not equivalent to a group's marching in a parade."' The court
explained that Hurley protects an organization's constitutional right to
exclude from its membership persons who advocate a message that an
organization wishes not to disseminate. 42 The court reasoned that unlike
a marcher in a parade, Dale did not participate in the BSA to "make a
point' about sexuality. 43 Dale's mere presence in the organization was
not symbolic of the BSA's endorsement of homosexuality and, therefore,
reinstatement of Dale would not compel the BSA to advocate any
message.'" Forcing the BSA to accept Dale, the court concluded, was
not an infringement on the BSA's constitutional right of free speech.' 45
This case is currently on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court
granted certiorari on January 14, 2000'" and heard oral arguments on
April 26, 2000. The Court is considering the following question: "Does
state law requiring Boy Scout troop to appoint avowed homosexual and
gay rights activist as assistant scoutmaster responsible for communi-
cating Boy Scouting's moral values to youth members abridge First
Amendment rights of freedom of speech and freedom of association."' 47
138. See id Presumably, if the position papers had been written before Dale's expulsion, the BSA
would have had a more persuasive argument that an anti-gay message was an expressive purpose.
This argument may still have failed because the papers were never disseminated to members or
leaders and the anti-gay message was still absent from most Scouting literature. Furthermore, the
BSA, as would be required to overcome New Jersey's compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination, did not prove that its members associate with one another at least in some significant
part to convey anti-gay views as a shared position.
139. See d at 1224-25.
140. See id at 1226.
141. See id at 1229.
142. See id
143. Id
144. See id
145. See id
146. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 865 (Jan. 14,2000).
147. 68 U.S.L.W. 3449.
595
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2. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America:
Opposition to Homosexuality Is an Expressive Purpose of the BSA
That Warrants Constitutional Protection
Although the Supreme Court of California in Curran v. Mount Diablo
Council of the Boy Scouts of America148 held that the BSA was not
subject to California's public-accommodations statute, 149 the concurrence
noted that the BSA would have a compelling argument that its
associational rights would be violated if it was forced to include gay
scout leaders. 5 Timothy Curran achieved the highest possible BSA
rank, that of Eagle Scout.' His membership ended automatically when
he turned eighteen years old. 2 After his eighteenth birthday, although he
was no longer an official member of the BSA, Curran continued to
participate in his former troop's activities.' It was during this time, the
summer of 1980, that the Oakland Tribune featured Curran in an article
on gay teenagers.5 4 Nothing in the article mentioned Curran's
relationship to the BSA.'
After the BSA declined Curran's application to be an assistant master,
Curran met with Quentin Alexander, executive director of the Mt. Diablo
Council of the BSA." 6 During the meeting, Alexander asked "if [Curran]
espoused that lifestyle still.' 5 7 Curran told Alexander that he did and
stated that "he specifically wanted to [be in the Scouts]-because he so
firmly believed personally in a homosexual lifestyle that there
was ... not anything wrong with it, and he wanted to make sure that
other kids understood that."'58 Alexander indicated that the BSA could
not accept Curran's application.'59 Curran filed suit against the BSA
alleging that the BSA's rejection of his application to become an
148. 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998).
149. See id. at238.
150. See id. at 254 (Kennard, J., concurring).
151. See id. at 220.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 221.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at222.
159. See id.
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assistant scoutmaster violated California's public-accommodations
statute, the Unruh Civil Rights Act.'
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision that
the BSA is an expressive association whose expressive activities would
be substantially interfered with if the Unruh Act applied. 161 Without
distinguishing whether Curran's exclusion was based on his status or his
conduct, the court held that the BSA does not have to express publicly its
view that homosexuality is immoral to be afforded constitutional
protection. 62 The court further rejected Curran's argument that to protect
the BSA's expressive association, the members must have joined
together because of a belief in the immorality of homosexual conduct.63
Instead, the appellate court relied on the trial court's factual finding that
opposition to homosexual conduct has been a longstanding part of the
BSA's belief system, even if this was not the principal reason for
forming the BSA." In determining the BSA's views, the trial court,
discrediting Curran's witnesses, relied upon the defense witnesses who
allegedly expressed the organization's views. 65 This testimony from the
BSA leaders concerning its anti-gay policy, combined with the court's
interpretation of "morally straight" and "clean," was the only evidence
the court used to justify the necessary connection between the BSA's
expressive purpose concerning sexual morality and the BSA's
discriminatory policy.' 66
On appeal, the Supreme Court of California never arrived at the
expressive-association issue because it held that the BSA is not a
"business establishment" and therefore not subject to California's public-
accommodations statute. 67 Nevertheless, Justice Kennard, in a concur-
ring opinion, concluded that had the court found that the BSA was a
business establishment, the BSA's constitutional rights likely would have
outweighed the state's goal of equal opportunity.' 6 In arriving at this
160. See id
161. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 590
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994), aff'don other grounds, 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998).
162. See id at 586.
163. See id at 586-87.
164. See id at 588.
165. See id at 588-89.
166. See Id. at 584-89.
167. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 238-39 (Cal.
1998).
168. See id at 254 (Kennard, J., concurring).
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conclusion, Kennard relied on the trial court's finding that the official
position of the BSA is that "homosexuality is immoral and incompatible
with the BSA Oath and Law."'69 According to Justice Kennard, the BSA
would have had a "compelling argument" that forcing it to accept gay
scout leaders, or anyone else with views contrary to the BSA's "guiding
precepts," would violate the BSA's First Amendment associational
rights.
70
3. Merino v. San Diego County Council of the Boy Scouts of
America: An Openly Gay Leader Inherently Advocates a Message
Contrary to the BSA s Anti-Gay View
California's Fourth District Court of Appeals also addressed the
application of California's public-accommodations statute to the BSA in
Merino v. San Diego County Council of the Boy Scouts of America.'7'
Although the majority concluded that the BSA is not a "business
establishment" and therefore exempt from the statute,'72 Judge Huffman
filed a concurring opinion stating that even if the BSA met the definition
of business establishment, forced inclusion of Merino, a scout leader who
was suspended for publicly announcing that he was gay, would be an
unconstitutional intrusion on the BSA's associational rights. 73 Contrary
to the trial court's factual finding, Judge Huffman concluded that an anti-
gay message, like patriotism, courage, and self-reliance, is an expressive
purpose of the BSA. 74 Although no evidence showed that the BSA
framed its defense in terms of free speech rather than expressive
association, Judge Huffman relied on Hurley, equating Merino's
openness about his sexuality with expressive conduct to justify the
BSA's constitutional right to exclude Merino.'75
169. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring).
170. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring).
171. Nos. D021969, D022829, 1997 WL 1145151 (Cal. Ct. App. May 21, 1997).
172. Seeid at *8.
173. See id. at * 13 (Huffman, J., concurring).
174. See id. (Huffinan, J., concurring).
175. See i. (Huffinan, J., concurring).
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4. Richardson v. Chicago Area Council of the Boy Scouts of America:
BSA 's Opposition to Homosexuality Is a Discriminatory Hiring
Practice, Not an Expressive Purpose
In Richardson v. Chicago Area Council of the Boy Scouts of
America,7 6 the Chicago Commission on Human Relations concluded
that the BSA's employment policies excluding gays violated the Chicago
Human Rights Ordinance.'" The Commission began its expressive-
association analysis by distinguishing Hurley.'78 In contrast to Hurley,
where the Court protected the discriminating organization's freedom of
speech, the BSA urged the Commission to protect its discriminatory
policy based on its expressive associational rights.'79 The Commission
explained that, unlike in Hurley, the BSA must prove that opposition to
homosexuality is an "expressive goal."'80 "Inherent in the term
'expressive goal' ... is the requirement that opposition to homosexuality
be embodied in some writing or oral statement which is identified as a
goal, philosophy, belief or value of Scouting and further it must be
expressed as one of Scouting's goals.''. The BSA argued that
opposition to homosexuality always has been one of its expressive
purposes as evidenced by the terms "morally straight" and "clean."' 2
The Commission, unconvinced by this argument, concluded that
opposition to homosexuality is not an expressive goal of the BSA and
that the BSA's anti-gay policy is simply a discriminatory hiring
practice.' In rejecting the BSA's argument, the Commission concluded
that not only are the terms "morally straight" and "clean" vague, but
nowhere in these terms' definitions are there any references to sexual
176. No. 92-E-80, 1996 WL 734724 (Chicago Comm'n on Human Relations Feb. 21, 1996). In an
unpublished opinion, the Illinois Circuit Court of Cook County affirmed the Commission's decision.
See Chicago Area Council of Boy Scouts of Am. v. Richardson, No. 96 CH 03266, at 1 (iIl. Cir. Ct.
Aug. 12, 1999) (on file with author). At the time this Comment went to publication, the Illinois
Appellate Court had agreed to hear the appeal. See Chicago Area Council of Boy Scouts of Am. v.
Richardson, No. 96 CH 03266, at 1 (Il1. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 1999), appeal docketed, No. 1-993018 (Ill.
App. Ct. Aug. 23, 1999).
177. See Richardson, 1996 WL 734724, at *I. Although this case was in the employment context,
the Commission's analysis mirrored expressive-purpose analysis.
178. See id. at *29.
179. See id,
180. Id at *30.
181. Id
182. See id at *31.
183. See id at *33-34.
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orientation.'"4 While the BSA witnesses testified that they believed the
terms referred to being heterosexual, the Commission concluded that the
BSA leaders' "personal interpretations have no basis in Scouting
doctrine."'8 5 The BSA argued that its goals are whatever its leadership
says they are, that "only Scouting can speak for Scouting.' ' s6 The BSA
argued that because the BSA leadership has taken the position that the
words "morally straight" and "clean" refer to being heterosexual, it is
irrelevant what others within Scouting believe or what the Handbook
states. 7 The Commission, however, also rejected this argument, stating
that "an organization with a defined body of doctrine cannot just choose
to interpret its goals differently from their stated meaning merely to
justify a discriminatory hiring policy.' 88
The Commission could not find any evidence of the BSA's anti-gay
message in the thousands of pages of Scouting literature, recruiting
brochures and videos, handbooks, annual reports, and correspondence
they reviewed. 9 The Commission discredited the BSA's revised 1993
written employment policy as a response to litigation and concluded that
the only written expressive goal of opposing homosexuality was the 1978
internal memorandum.' The court found this evidence alone insufficient
to indicate that one of the BSA's expressive goals was opposition to
homosexuality.
III. COURTS SHOULD RELY ONLY ON CLEAR AND
OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE THE BOY SCOUTS
OF AMERICA'S EXPRESSIVE PURPOSE
A major shortcoming of the Roberts trilogy is its failure to provide
guidance on how courts should determine an organization's expressive
purpose. As the BSA cases demonstrate, in the absence of specific
guidelines, the courts have broad discretion to decide what facts are
relevant. With this discretion, courts have allowed the subjective views
of individual BSA members and leaders to be mistaken for the
184. Seeid. at*31.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. Id. at *32.
189. See id. at*30-31.
190. See id. at *31.
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organization's expressive purpose. To address this problem, courts
should limit their analysis of expressive purpose to objective evidence to
prevent witnesses' personal interpretations of the BSA's expressive
purpose from coloring its stated meaning. Furthermore, limiting analysis
to objective evidence would preclude courts from using subjective
evidence as a scapegoat for espousing homophobic or heterosexist 91
readings of the BSA's vaguely articulated purpose. When the BSA seeks
to shelter itself from antidiscrimination laws by taking refuge in the First
Amendment, its message of hate should be clearly articulated in position
statements distributed internally and externally, written in recruiting
brochures, announced to sponsors, and referred to in either the original
bylaws or amended bylaws. When courts afford constitutional protection
to less discernible expressive purposes, the state's goal of equal
opportunity is frustrated.
A. Limiting Analysis to Objective Evidence Prevents Witnesses'
Personal Interpretations of the BSA 's Expressive Purpose from
Coloring Its Stated Meaning
By relying on witnesses' personal interpretations of the BSA's
purposes and beliefs, courts have permitted the BSA, an organization
with a defined body of doctrine, simply to tailor its goals and purposes to
its particular litigation needs. As a result, courts' interpretations of the
BSA's expressive purpose may be based on their perceptions of
witnesses' sincerity and whether the proffered witnesses are represen-
tative of the membership as a whole. If courts limit their analysis to clear
and objective evidence when determining whether the BSA's goals are
linked to its exclusionary policy, the BSA would not be permitted to
stray from its explicitly stated purposes nor would it be allowed to take
advantage of the ambiguities created by its vaguely articulated message.
An example of a court's limiting its analysis to objective evidence is
found in Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v.
Thurmont.'" In that case, the court, upholding the KKK's right to
191. As used here, "heterosexism" is the view that heterosexuality is "natural" and that lesbian
and gay sexuality is inferior. See Rhonda Copelon, A Crime Not Fit to Be Named: Sex, Lies, and the
Constitution, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 177, 191 n.2 (David Kairys ed., 1990).
This view is systematically implemented through law, custom, and other vehicles. See id
"Heterosexism" should be distinguished from "homophobia," which is the fear and loathing of
lesbians and gay men. See id
192. 700 F. Supp. 281 (D. Md. 1988).
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exclude nonwhites and non-Christians from its parade, concluded that the
testimony of the KKK's grand dragon that he did not believe in white
supremacy was irrelevant.'93 The court instead noted that it was clear
from the KKK's brochures that the group as a whole believed in white
supremacy."9 Not even the grand dragon's testimony could disconnect
the membership from the message.
By affording constitutional protection to the impressions of designated
leaders, courts allow the secrecy of the elite's interpretations of the
organization's message to override the democracy of the group's
definition of its message. In the BSA cases, if "only Scouting can speak
for Scouting,"'95 as the BSA argues, there would be few limits on the
BSA's personal interpretations of its message. What would happen if the
BSA, through witness testimony, suddenly advocated exclusion of
Jewish or African-American leaders simply because the BSA leadership
at that time personally interpreted the words "morally straight" and
"clean" to mean that scout leaders must be Protestant or white?
According to the BSA's argument, this should be permissible. It seems
highly improbable that courts today, however, would infuse the words
"morally straight" and "clean" with religion or race, even if the BSA
leadership took that position. Yet courts have been willing to infuse these
words with a sexual orientation simply because certain members of the
BSA leadership personally believed in the immorality of homosexuality.
This secrecy of the elite leadership is antithetical to the Roberts trilogy's
requirement that a clearly defined expressive purpose be a condition of
constitutional protection.'96
The BSA's attempt to assert a First Amendment freedom-of-
association defense by characterizing its anti-gay policy as an expressive
goal of Scouting is similar to the attempt made twenty years ago by Dade
Christian School to justify its refusal to accept black students on
freedom-of-religion grounds. 97 In Brown v. Dade Christian Schools,
Inc.,"'98 the court refused to give any deference to leaders' testimony and
instead looked only at objective evidence to determine whether the
193. See id. at 289 n.2.
194. See id.
195. Richardson, 1996 WL 734724, at *3 1.
196. See supra Part I.C; see also Hutchinson, supra note 85, at 102.
197. See Richardson, 1996 WL 734724, at *32 (citing Brown v. Dade Christian Schs., Inc., 556
F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977)).
198. 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977).
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school's policy of segregation was the result of religious exercise. 199 In
that case, a secular school asserted that forced integration would violate
its First Amendment right of free exercise of religion.200 The court found,
however, that because none of the school's written tenets included
anything related to segregation of schools or separation of races, the First
Amendment would not validate the discriminatory policy.2°' The court
stated that "the absence of references to school segregation in written
literature stating the church's beliefs, distributed to members of the
church and the public by leaders of the church and administrators of the
school, is strong evidence that school segregation is not the exercise of
religion. 20 2 After hearing testimony from individuals including the
original vice-president, the concurrence recognized that there were
individuals within the school who held sincere beliefs concerning
segregation. 3 In fact, Dr. Arthur E. Kreft, the school's principal,
testified at his deposition that enrolling blacks would alienate him from
God "in the sense that I would be disobedient, according to my beliefs in
the Scriptures."' "° Nevertheless, the court held:
[T]he refusal by Dade Christian School to admit a black child was
an institutional action taken by an institution whose patrons are,
according to the evidence, divided in their beliefs on the religious
justification for racial segregation. In such a situation the only
practical course open to a Court is to examine the corporate beliefs
of the institution involved, as adopted or promulgated or carried
forward as an institutional concept. To do otherwise would allow
the institution to pick and choose which of its members' potentially
conflicting beliefs it wished to assert at any given time. Thus, an
avowedly secular school should not be permitted to interpose a free
exercise defense to a § 1981 action merely because it can find some
of its patrons who have a sincere religiously based belief in racial
segregation."
Unlike in Dade Christian Schools, the Curran court fell prey to
relying on "witnesses uniquely qualified" to testify that the stand against
199. See id. at 312-13.
200. See U at311.
201. Seeid at312.
202. Id.
203. See Ua at 318-19 (Brown, .1., concurring).
204. Id at 318 (Brown, CJ., concurring).
205. I at 313 (emphasis added).
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homosexual conduct is part of the BSA belief system.2' The Curran
court stated:
Especially in a volunteer organization, where members who
disagree with the organization's expressions are free to leave at any
time, the organization is an appropriate vehicle to raise the
expressive association rights of its members since for all practical
purposes the expressions of the group are the expressions of the
members. °7
To say that the organization and its members are in every practical
sense identical is a fiction created to support the trial court's reliance on
the particular "uniquely qualified" witnesses that the lawyers for the
BSA called to the stand to express the "organization's" message. Thus,
an avowedly all-inclusive organization should not be permitted to
interpose a freedom-of-association defense to a legitimate state public-
accommodations law merely because some of its leaders or members
sincerely believe that gay people are antithetical to the BSA belief
system. Rather than giving preferential weight to uniquely qualified
witnesses, courts should, like in Dade Christian Schools, Richardson,
and Thurmont, solely consider the BSA's objective materials.
B. Limiting Analysis to Objective Evidence Is the Most Prudent Means
by Which a Court Can Arrive at an Unbiased Interpretation of the
BSA 's Expressive Purpose
While cases revolving around social issues are couched in legal
doctrine, it would be naYve to ignore the impact of societal values and
perceptions on these decisions. Simply put, the law reflects societal
biases and prejudices. Although the social categories of discrimination
may change over time, there is always a legally stigmatized group. To
prevent further stigmatization of gays, courts in the BSA cases should
limit their analysis of expressive purpose to objective evidence to
interpret, without bias, the BSA's vaguely articulated message.
This history of judicially sanctioned stigmatization is readily apparent
in legal opinions throughout history. In Dred Scott v. Sandford,208 a
206. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 585 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994), aff'don other grounds, 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998).
207. Id. at 587-88.
208. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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former slave sought recognition as a free citizen.2" Relying on the
constitutional framers' intent, the Court denied Dred Scott's claim of
freedom and pronounced the constitutional inferiority of African-
American people.21 One hundred years later, in In re Strittmater's
Estate," the court considered a woman insane due to her "morbid
aversion to men and [her devotion to] feminism to a neurotic extreme. 2 2
As such, the court held that she did not have testamentary capacity and
her bequest to the National Women's Party was revoked due to the
court's perception of her insanity.2" 3
Just as racism and sexism controlled those courts' opinions, so too can
a court's homophobia2 4 affect its decision.2 5 Judges often bring to the
resolution of gay-rights lawsuits a deep and unrecognized homophobia
that leads to a process by which the oppression of gays and lesbians, like
that of African-Americans and women, is rationalized as a protection of
intimate life and "family values. 216 This bias was exhibited in Ratchford
v. Gay Lib,217 where Justice William Rehnquist in dissent used the
imagery of disease to discuss gay sexual life.218 He wrote, "[T]he
question is more akin to whether those suffering from measles have a
constitutional right, in violation of quarantine regulations, to associate
together and with others who do not presently have measles."2 9 As one
legal scholar noted, to compare homosexuality and contagious disease is
"quintessential homophobia.""2  Justice Rehnquist's comparison is
reminiscent of The Eternal Jew's depiction of the Jews of Poland as
diseased, corrupt, filthy, and perverse."' In this film, footage of rats
209. See d. at400.
210. See id. at409.
211. 53 A.2d 205 (NJ. 1947).
212. Id. at205.
213. See/aL at206.
214. See Copelon, supra note 191, at 191 n.2.
215. See David AJ. Richards, Women, Gays, and the Constitution 346-54 (1998).
216. See a at 349; see also Copelon, supra note 191, at 178.
217. 434 U.S. 1080 (1978) (Rehnquist and Blackmun, JI., dissenting from Supreme Court's
refusal to review order requiring recognition of gay-rights group).
218. See id. at 1084 (Rehnquist and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
219. Id. (Rehnquist and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
220. Copelon, supra note 191, at 179.
221. See Stig Hornshlj-Moller, Stig Hornshoj-Moller on Der Ewige Jude (last modified Feb. 21,
1999) <http'//www.holocaust-history.org/der-ewige-jude> (describing Homshtj-Mller's analysis of
Nazi propaganda film The Eternal Jew).
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squirming from sewers and leaping at the camera is interspersed with
photos of Rabbis and a narration explaining the Jews' rat-like
behavior.222 The gross depiction there, however, was in the most famous
Nazi propaganda film, rather than in the courtroom.
For a court to identify the neutral words "morally straight" and
"clean" as found in the Boy Scout Oath with heterosexuality and, by
inference, "not morally straight" and "not clean" with homosexuality, is
also quintessentially homophobic. Without admitting personal bias, the
Dale trial court concluded that it was "abundantly clear from the proofs
presented by the BSA" that homosexuality is not "morally straight" or
"clean."223 In support of this, the court in its "Legal Analysis" relied on
the Bible, referring to the King James Version's depiction of the
destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah by "fire and brimstone rained down
by the Lord" and equating "sexual depravity" in that biblical story with
"active homosexuality." '224 The court also discussed the "Judeo-Christian
tradition" that has "always" considered an act of sodomy to be a "gravely
serious moral wrong" and concluded that "the major religions of the
civilized world all deem [homosexuality] immoral."2" As if the
preceding "analysis" did not suffice, the trial court further wrote:
"Clearly, if Dale had engaged in criminal activity such as using or
dealing in controlled dangerous substances; if he were a rapist or
murderer or pederast there could be no basis to claim a violation of [New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination] in revoking his commission as an
assistant scoutmaster." 26 Like Justice Rehnquist's use of the imagery of
disease to discuss gay sexual life, the trial court's comparison of Dale's
sexuality to being a rapist and child molester perpetuates the degrading,
cruel, and unfounded stereotypes that have plagued stigmatized groups of
people throughout history.
While the Dale trial court infused the words "morally straight" and
"clean" with a sexual orientation by comparing Dale's sexuality to being
a rapist and child molester, Justice Kennard concluded her concurrence
222. See id.
223. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. MON-C-330-92, slip op. at 38 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
Nov. 3, 1995), rev'd, 706 A.2d 270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), aff'd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J.
1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 865 (Jan. 14, 2000).
224. Id. at 39.
225. Id. at 39, 43.
226. Id. at 43.
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in Curran by comparing the BSA to the NAACP and the B'nai B'rith.' 7
She rhetorically asked, "Could the NAACP be compelled to accept as a
member a Ku Klux Klansman? Could B'nai B'rith be required to admit
an anti-Semite? If the First Amendment protects the membership
decisions of these groups, must it not afford the same protection to the
membership decisions of the Boy Scouts?" 8 The more appropriate
question would have been whether gays are so antithetical to the BSA
that they deserve to be compared to Klansmen and anti-Semites.
Comparing gays to Klansmen and anti-Semites is similar to Justice
Rehnquist's comparison of homosexuality to a contagious disease and
the Dale trial court's comparison of a gay man to a rapist and child
molester. To be labeled diseased or to be called a rapist, child molester,
Klansmen, or anti-Semite is to be deemed deviant. When courts compare
gay people to these deviant groups, they implicitly brand gays abnormal
and invoke images of fear; avoidance, and outrage. These images,
created by the courts' biases, inevitably form the basis of their legal
opinions.
Courts that treat a gay person's openness about his or her identity as
"advocacy" again fall prey to heterosexist, if not homophobic, biases
and, in the process, grant constitutional protection to "overbroad
assumptions" based on nothing more than stereotypical notions that the
Supreme Court warned against in Roberts. 9 Without any evidence that
Merino had expressed views on the morality of homosexuality, Judge
Huffman in concurrence wrote, "A person who is an avowed homosexual
who seeks to serve as a scout leader is manifesting views that are at odds
with those of the organization on the issue of leadership criteria." '
Merely stating or revealing one's sexual orientation, however, should not
constitute advocacy for First Amendment purposes. The antidis-
crimination protections that embody public-accommodations laws
become illusory if the very means of making one's status known can
justify discrimination against that person."' "Such penalties would make
the promise of equality a sham for lesbian and gay citizens, comparable
227. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 257 (Cal.
1998) (Kennard, J., concurring).
228. Il
229. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,625,628 (1984).
230. Merino v. San Diego County Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., Nos. D021969, D022829,
1997 WL 1145151, at *13 (Cal. Ct. App. May 21, 1997) (Huffinan, J., concurring).
231. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196,1238 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., concurring).
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to denying religion-based protection to Jews who wear yarmulkes or
Christians who wear crosses. 232
This is even truer when the distinguishing group characteristics are
invisible. 3 As one scholar explained, suppression of identity speech-
speech that promotes or professes homosexuality-leads to a "compelled
falsehood. 234 Without identity speech, most persons are assumed to be
heterosexual. 2 ' To force silence is to force persons who are not
heterosexual to lie.236 As the Scout Handbook explains, "A Scout is
trustworthy. A Scout tells the truth. He is honest, and he keeps his
promises."" It is dishonesty, not homosexuality, that is truly antithetical
to the BSA belief system.
Limiting analysis of expressive purpose to objective evidence will
expose such homophobia and heterosexism as the courts' biases, and the
courts' alone. Witness testimony offers courts a scapegoat for espousing
homophobic or heterosexist readings of the BSA's vaguely articulated
purpose. The courts thereby implicitly assist the BSA in sheltering itself
from antidiscrimination laws. By relying only on objective evidence,
courts would be less likely to infuse the BSA materials with their own
biases.
B. Limiting Analysis of Expressive Purpose to Objective Evidence
Protects Constitutional Rights
When courts rely on subjective evidence, there is a greater chance that
individual constitutional rights will be violated. When the Curran court
of appeals noted that members who disagree with the BSA's opinions are
free to leave at any time,238 it made a significant assumption: that
232. Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1695, 1718 (1993).
233. Dissenting from the Court's denial of certiorari, Justice William Brennan noted with respect
to a plaintiff who had been fired after informing coworkers of her bisexuality, "[I]t is realistically
impossible to separate her spoken statements from her status." Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch.
Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1016 n.11 (1985). For discussions of the interdependence between speech and
identity for gays and lesbians, see, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 31, at 180; Hunter, supra note 232, at
1718; and Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
443 (1998).
234. Hunter, supra note 232, at 1718.
235. See id
236. Seeid at 1719.
237. Boy Scouts of Am., supra note 102, at 47.
238. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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members actually know the opinions. The BSA, as an expressive
organization, chooses a set of values it wants inculcated. It is inconsistent
for the BSA to seek constitutional protection as an expressive association
if it fails to reveal all of these values, especially one that directly
interferes with the state's goal of equal opportunity. The members cannot
truly know all of the BSA's opinions if the BSA is willing to make only
selected opinions known. Additionally, parents who permit their sons to
join the BSA have an associational right not to associate with
homophobes. Freedom of association protects not only the right to
associate but the right not to associate. 9 If the BSA seeks to shelter
itself from public-accommodations laws, parents must understand the
BSA teachings so they can choose whether they want their children to
join an organization that discriminates.
IV. CONCLUSION
Like the words of the Constitution or those of the Bible, the words of
the Scout Oath and Scout Law have different meanings for different
people.2' The BSA's witnesses equated the words contained in the Oath
and Law exclusively with the status and practice of heterosexuality.24
These views were epitomized by the testimony of William McClaughlin,
the director of personnel administration of the National Council of the
BSA, who stated that in his opinion all behavior related to homosexual
orientation is "immoral or indecent."242 McClaughlin testified that a gay
man is not able to devote himself to others, simply because he is gay.243
The expelled scout leaders and their witnesses, on the other hand, never
understood the words "morally straight" or "clean" to refer to sexual
orientation in any way.2' This contraposition evidences the fact that the
BSA has failed to elevate its asserted anti-gay message to a level that
warrants constitutional protection as an expressive purpose.
Courts should limit their analysis of expressive purpose to objective
evidence. With this limitation, the BSA would be forced to articulate
239. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,234-35 (1977).
240. See Richardson v. Chicago Area Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., No. 92-E-80, 1996 WL
734724, at *12 (Chicago Comm'n on Human Relations Feb. 21, 1996).
241. See ta
242. Id. at *1l1.
243. See Id.
244. See id.at*12.
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publicly its hatred, which has instead only been revealed by subjective
witness testimony and substantiated as a result of courts' biases. With
this limitation, gays may perhaps win one small legal and social battle-
courts may recognize that gays are not as antithetical to the Boy Scouts
of America as anti-Semites are to the B'nai B'rith or white supremacists
are to the NAACP.
